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Myths about the Army Profession

Five Myths about Our Future
Don M. Snider

Abstract: The Army, and many of its professionals, still behave
far too much like they are leading, and serving, in little more than
a government bureaucracy. To advance the implementation of the
new doctrines, old myths must be destroyed. That is the purpose
of this article and the next by Dr. Pfaff, to expose the myths as
the falsehoods they are and replace them with correct, motivational
understandings.

I

n a recent and quite prescient US Army War College publication,
“Changing Minds in the Army: Why It Is So Difficult and What to
Do about It,” two faculty members explain a core issue of Army
leaders—the ability to re-evaluate personal frames of reference when
confronting new information: “Unfortunately, shattering or unlearning
frames of reference is an action that is easy to espouse, yet incredibly
difficult to execute.” The authors note one convention senior leaders can
use to assess their frames successfully is a red team charged with a direct,
yet tactful, challenge. When presented within a culture of trust created by
the leader, the team’s ability to speak truth effectively to those in power
is greatly enhanced.1
Similarly, Dr. Tony Pfaff, the War College’s new professor of
the Army Profession and Ethic, and I have collaborated to confront
commonly held myths that can rightly be understood as specific frames
of reference senior Army leaders, indeed all Army professionals, need
to change. This article focuses on incorrect frames of reference still
held three years after The Army Profession doctrine was implemented.2
In each case these frames, these myths, are almost incompatible with
the institution’s doctrine, thus hindering not only the timely implementation but also the desirable influence on the effectiveness of the Army
and its professionals.
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The Army is and will always be a military profession—not true.
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and the ratification of the Constitution in 1789, both the Congress and
the executive have continued to exercise their Constitutional powers to
treat the Army just like every other federal bureaucracy. The institutional
character and behavior of government bureaucracy, therefore, has been
and will be the US Army’s default setting.
Turning now to the Army’s professional status, which was attained
by cohort during various periods of the institution’s history, the creation
of branch schools, consistent terms of service, and promotions by merit
rather than patronage slowly professionalized the officer corps during
the mid to late-nineteenth century; the noncommissioned officer corps
by World War II.4 But professionalizing the Army did not cause its character of origin—government bureaucracy—to go away. Bureaucracy
remains in the background and constantly creates tension within the
profession. So the Army is uniquely an institution of dual cultures in
which only one culture can be dominant at a given time and Army leaders
determine through their daily leadership at each location whether the
dominant culture is that of the profession or of the default bureaucracy.5
Since becoming a profession, the US Army’s degree of professionalization has ebbed and flowed. The most recent decline of culture and
ethos of profession occurred during the late-Vietnam War period and
the morph into bureaucratic behavior caused immense loss of trust by
the American people. But trust, with both internal Army ranks and
external citizens, is the currency that legitimizes professions and it is
ever perishable. In Western democracies, the client—in this case the
American people—gets to determine if an institution is treated as a venerated profession meriting the autonomy necessary to do its expert work.
Thus, by the end of the Vietnam War, the Army had lost not only public
confidence but also its status as a military profession and the associated
autonomy. Likewise, it is wrong to infer “once a profession, always a
profession” from Professor Huntington’s influential work when modern
competitive professions, such as post-Cold War European land armies,
do in fact die as they morph into military bureaucracies.6
Unfortunately, because it believes it will always be a military
profession, the Army has only studied itself as a military profession
episodically. More often than not the institution simply declared itself a
profession and continued to operate much like a bureaucracy. Although
civilian historians have conducted most research on the military as a
profession, the Army chief of staff did direct the US Army War College
to conduct internally a “Study on Military Professionalism” after the
failures in Vietnam.7

4     Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United
States of America, rev. ed. (New York: Free Press, 1994), 133–37.
5     In earlier publications the sharp differences between these two cultures have been more specifically contrasted. See Don M. Snider, “Will Army 2025 be a Military Profession?,” Parameters 45,
no. 4 (Winter 2015–16): 40.
6     Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957); and Andrew D. Abbott, The System
of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988),
28–34.
7     See, for example, Allan R. Millett, The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military:
A Historical Perspective (Columbus: Mershon Center of Ohio State University, 1979); and US Army
War College, Study on Military Professionalism (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1970).
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Notwithstanding the quality of the War College study that
highlighted the unprofessional nature of the Army officer corps in
the early 1970s; the Army did not perform another self-study on the
profession for the next 30 years. In 2000 a group of faculty at West
Point, aided by civilian colleagues from several academic institutions
and disciplines, renewed the study of the US Army as a military profession, publishing four books from 2000 to 2010 that laid the intellectual
groundwork for more recent doctrinal publications.8
In summary, the Army is an institution of dual character—
bureaucracy and profession. With constant tension between their
cultures, how the Army conducts itself each day in each location is
determined by the effectiveness of Army leaders acting as the stewards
of the Army Profession. The stewards’ role is to resolve deep cultural
tensions and behaviors by leading the institution to manifest the five
characteristics essential to the Army’s status as profession: military
expertise ready for any contingency, a culture that fosters honorable
service by all professionals, an esprit de corps that overcomes the
adversity of combat, stewardship of the Army Profession, and military effectiveness that generates respect and trust from the American
people.9 Only under those conditions can the US Army continue to be
a military profession.

The Army Profession is just about the historic profession of
arms—not true.

It is true the Army community of practice that approached the initial
tasker to research and study the meaning of the Army as a profession
did start producing doctrine based upon the historic profession of
arms.10 Soon, however, the doctrine writing process fostered deeper
reflection within the community as to whether in the current era the
Army Profession should, or even could, be composed only of those who
bear arms. After another year of deliberating and drafting the document
that would eventually become official doctrine, a new consensus clearly
formed. Consequently, Army leadership made a conscious decision during
2011 and 2012 that led to the profession of arms and the Army civilian corps jointly comprising the Army Profession. Specifically, the first
decade of conflict in the Middle East caused the community to rationalize
the inclusion of the Army civilian corps, which enables professionals to
fight effectively as an expeditionary force. Thus the belief that the whole
Army—uniformed and civilian—must be a coherent and cohesive
military profession informed the doctrinal definition of the expertise
and role of Army professionals:
Military expertise is the ethical design, generation, support, and application of landpower, primarily in unified land operations, and all supporting
capabilities essential to accomplish the mission in defense of the American
8     The four text books are: Lloyd J. Mathews, ed., The Future of the Army Profession, with Don M.
Snider and Gayle L. Watkins (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002); Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Mathews,
The Future of the Army Profession, 2nd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2005); Don M. Snider, Lloyd J.
Matthews, Eric K. Shinseki, Forging the Warrior’s Character: Moral Precepts from the Cadet Prayer (Boston:
McGraw-Hill, 2008); and Suzanne C. Nielsen and Don M. Snider, eds., American Civil-Military
Relations: The Soldier and the State in a New Era (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
9     ADRP 1, 1-4.
10     US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), “The Profession of Arms,” white
paper (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2010), 1.
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people. Soldiers and Army Civilians will find within this definition the role
their units and organizations play in ultimately applying landpower and how
their own contribution fits into the larger mission.11

Army civilians have for some time provided expertise, stability, and
continuity in most major army organizations. The recent decision to
include the Army civilian corps within the profession created recognition that the Army needed to more deeply professionalize the civilian
corps with individual and institutional developmental programs as it did
in earlier periods for the other cohorts. In fact, the rate and effectiveness with which the civilian corps professionalizes will likely be a major
determinant of how well the US Army can meet the challenge to “win
in a complex world.”12

The practice of Army professionals is about applying large
amounts of technology—not true.

Apache pilots and Abrams tank drivers might think this statement
to be true; however, the professional art, the practice, of any Army
professional is best understood as “repetitive exercise of discretionary
judgments” executed by actions that apply the expert knowledge and
skills of individual professionals and the units they compose.13 In fact,
this definition is now Army doctrine and true regardless of which
cohort—uniformed or civilian—a professional serves within. These
actions are then analyzed for their effectiveness by after-action reviews
and potential adaptations to knowledge and practices in the form of
doctrine as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Discretionary judgments are informed by many years of studying
and training within the fields of expert knowledge—military-technical
(how the Army actually fights); moral-ethical (how we enter, fight,
and end wars rightly by the values of the American people); politicalcultural (how we operate outside the boundaries of the Army to create
joint, interagency, and allied effectiveness in both peace and war); and
knowledge of human and leader development (how Army professionals
of all cohorts are assessed, developed, and employed over a lifetime of
service).14 Whether made during peacetime or during war, these judgments are inevitably moral judgments because they directly influence
the well-being of other humans—Army professionals, their families, the
enemy, and innocents on the battlefield.
Army doctrine uses the term “discretionary judgments” as discussed
above rather than simply “decisions” to establish Army professionals
must be developed and then trusted to act with significant autonomy of
action, the true mark of a professional. Granting such discretion through
limited autonomy and underwriting prudent risk-taking by junior leaders
is the behavior of a profession, not a government bureaucracy. These

11     ADRP 1, 5-1.
12     See TRADOC, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World, 2020–2040, TRADOC
Pamphlet 525-3-1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2014).
13     ADRP 1, 1-2.
14     ADRP 1, 5-1.
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positive behaviors are now being better facilitated through the Army’s
Mission Command doctrine.15
Quintessentially, Army professionals practice their art with their
minds, voices, and hands, even though they may also use massive
amounts of technology to implement their discretionary judgments.
But such technology is not a precondition to professional practice as
professions are human institutions, something the US Army has long
recognized and cherished when manifested in unit cohesion, esprit de
corps, and the personal camaraderie of a band of brothers and sisters
bound together in common moral purpose to defend our republic.

Competency is the most important aspect of being an Army
professional—absolutely not true.

Perhaps the most pernicious myth reflects the belief that the Army
is an amoral institution, that all we need to do is be proficient at our
specific tasks with little to no regard to whether those tasks are applied
to moral ends. No other myth could be further from the truth nor more
dangerous to the Army’s future. The development of Army professionals
has long focused, rightly, on the development of the individual’s competence and moral character. Current doctrine intentionally modifies
phrasing to make the commitment aspect of one’s professional character
explicit. Thus, the US Army now develops individual professionals,
regardless of cohort or rank, across the 3Cs—character, competence,
and commitment.
Such professional development draws deeply from the Army’s
Ethic, a slowly evolving set of foundational assumptions and beliefs
embedded within the Army’s culture. This ethic is the means of social
control within professions, reflecting “how we do things around here
to be effective at our profession’s work.”16 The Army’s history
most often shows competent professionals of well-developed moral
character and personal commitment are the leaders best able to make
correct moral judgments in the stress of combat.17 Vitally, the character,
competence, and commitment of an Army professional must be
integrated into their normative-ethical advice and actions involving the
lethality of our military practices. This integration is particularly important at the strategic level, the upper level of the profession’s civil-military
relationships, where the moral imperative that lives must not be wasted
is so heavy when advising on military options and outcomes to effect
political objectives.18
General Dempsey, the Army’s former chief of staff and thenchairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, summed up this issue quite
succinctly: “You can have someone of incredible character who can’t
15     HQDA, Mission Command, Army Doctrinal Publication 6-0 with Change 2 (Washington, DC:
HQDA, May 2014).
16      Don M. Snider, “American Military Professions and Their Ethics,” in Routledge Handbook of
Military Ethics, ed. George Lucas (London: Routledge / Taylor & Francis Group, 2015).
17      Patrick J. Sweeney and Sean T. Hannah, “High Impact Military Leadership: The Positive
Effects of Authentic Moral Leadership on Followers,” in Forging the Warrior’s Character, 91–116. The
critical finding of this research is that “trusted leaders will not only have the ability to lead followers
effectively in combat, they will also have the ability to change who they are as people” (95).
18      See, for example, James M. Dubik, “Taking a ‘Pro’ Position on Principled Resignation,”
Armed Forces and Society 1-12 (2016), doi:10.1177/0095327X16659736; and Dubik, “Civil and Military,
both Morally Obligated to Make War Work,” Army Magazine 65, no. 11 (November 2015).
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lead their way out of a forward operating base because they don’t have
the competence to understand the application of military power, and
that doesn’t do me any good. . . . Conversely, you can have someone who
is intensely competent, who is steeped in the skills of the profession, but
doesn’t live a life of character. And that doesn’t do me any good.”19
So, yes, the competence of an Army professional counts, but not a
bit more than the professional’s moral character and personal commitment. This fact is true in both conflict and peace. The US Army has
recently had too many instances like Abu Ghraib and Mahmudiyah as
well as the many public moral failures by senior Army leaders and major
matériel acquisition failures of all types to believe otherwise!

Whether the Army is a profession does not matter; we will
always get the job done—not necessarily true.

The Army’s effectiveness has depended on and will continue to
depend on professional behavior from the institution, individual professionals, and their units. Remember, as discussed under the first myth,
the Army is an institution of dual character that will always be part
large, lumbering government bureaucracy. But can that bureaucracy
win battles and ultimately wars in manners acceptable to the American
people? Why is the alternative character, military profession, different
with ebbs and flows over recent decades such as the Vietnam War’s low
point and the Persian Gulf War’s (1990–91) high point?
The difference can be explained by the things professions
routinely do and government bureaucracies seldom, if ever, do. The
most important are the creation of expert knowledge and the human
art and practices to apply that knowledge, which are natural functions
of all professions, including military ones. For just one example, the
doctrines of fighting and sustaining combined arms battles in joint and
allied coalitions have taken years to develop and adapt and so have the
battalion and brigade commanders who have the professional knowledge to apply those doctrines. That persistent development is the unique
work of a military profession—expert knowledge applied by leaders who
are experts in its application. But government bureaucracies generally do
not deal in such expert knowledge nor professional practices. Their role
in Western societies is to complete the routine, nonexpert, tasks (e.g.,
testing for and issuing drivers’ licenses) necessary for an ordered and
structured society.
Moreover, history shows that when stewards of the Army Profession
fail to conform the institution’s behavior to that of a profession, specifically keeping expert knowledge attuned to future needs, very bad things
can happen. In March 2003, after a successful conventional campaign to
take down the forces of Saddam Hussain, Baghdad fell. The US Army
then found itself with no expert knowledge or practice to deal with the
follow-on insurgency against our occupation. Note how General Ray

19      Thom Shanker, “Conduct at Issue as Military Officers Face a New Review,” New York Times,
April 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/us/militarys-top-officers-face-review-of
-their-character.html?_r=0e.
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Odierno, a division commander who later became the chief of staff of
the Army, described the situation:
When we first went there, we thought we would have a conventional
fight. . . . We had a conventional fight, which turned quickly into an insurgency
that was compounded by terrorism. . . . We were surprised by the changing
tactics we saw. We had no idea about the irregular aspect we were about to
face. We didn’t recognize this was a possibility. And when we did recognize
this, it took us too long to adjust.20

Notice the words he used, “we were surprised,” “we had no idea,”
“we didn’t recognize this.” An egregious failure had occurred by senior
stewards of the 1980s and 1990s who failed to keep the profession’s
knowledge and practices current to future needs. After Vietnam, the
Army simply dropped the essential knowledge of counterinsurgency and
instead focused narrowly on fighting Soviet forces in central Europe.21
That horrible failure was paid for with the lives of far too many American
soldiers and civilians, not to mention the prolonged nature of the conflict thereafter. So the point here is straightforward—as recent history
demonstrates, whether the US Army is a bureaucracy or a profession
makes all of the difference in combat effectiveness.

Conclusion

Army doctrine can often be turgid and too matter-of-fact. Doctrine
regarding the Army Profession and Ethic is no exception even though
significant efforts were expended to avoid that outcome. While doctrine
may be quite declaratory, explanations are sometimes not sufficient.
Thus, myths persist because the new information that Gerras and
Wong note must directly confront old frames of reference if they are
to change—the reasons why—are insufficient to be persuasive. So the
five explanations above as to “why” are offered specifically to assist the
stewards of the profession, and indeed all Army professionals, to change
their minds on these issues. Gerras and Wong conclude their study with:
“These questions are difficult to answer, but what we suggest in the
preceding paragraphs is that for an Army operating in an environment
of intense uncertainty and profound ambiguity, changing one’s mind
may not only be a distinct possibility, but also a pressing necessity.”22 I
could not agree with them more, and especially if the US Army is to be
a military profession.

20     Lance Bacon, “A Tested Top Warrior,” Army Times, September 19, 2011.
21     See Conrad C. Crane, Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2016), ch. 1.
22     Gerras and Wong, Changing Minds, 29.

